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Instructions, Message Form and Questionnaire
Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on
Costly Communication in Duopolies
1 Instructions
This is a translation of the actual instructions used in the pen and paper
(the instructions for the computer experiment only differed in the bid range)
which were written in Swedish to any avoid misunderstandings in the exper-
iment. We have tried to make the translation as direct as possible, but in
order to get the grammar right some differences are unavoidable. The part
that differs between the zero-cost and the costly setup were emphasized.
1.1 General instructions
This is an experiment about decisions in markets. It is important that you
do not talk to other participants during the actual experiment, and any
questions that occur should be addressed to the experimenters. Before the
experiment begins, there will be time to ask questions to the experimenters.
It is of great importance that you understand the structure of the exper-
iment, therefore it is important that you read the instructions thoroughly
so that no uncertainty, regarding the experiment, remains. All participants
are divided into two groups which in turn are placed in two different rooms.
Every player is assigned an ID-number, yours is located on your desk. You
will be paired with a participant from the other room and the two of you
will repeatedly play the game described below.
The game
You and your opponent will be asked to choose a number between 1 and 9
(decimal numbers are allowed). You write down your choice, in each period,
on the yellow form.
• If you choose a number which is higher than your opponent’s you will
earn 0 SEK this period.
• If you choose a number which is lower than your opponent’s you will
earn as much as the number you chose.
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• If you and your opponent choose the same number then you will split
the value of the number you chose.
For example: If you choose 3 and your opponent chooses 5 then
you earn 3 SEK and your opponent 0 SEK. If both of you choose
the number 7 then you will earn 3,5 SEK each.
After you and your opponent have chosen your numbers a new period will
begin with 92,5% probability. That is, there is a 7,5% chance that the game
will end after each period. The experimenter will inform you if the game
will proceed another period and which number your opponent chose. Your
final earning will consist of a starting-amount of 25 SEK and the winnings
from all periods.
Messages
Before each period you and your opponent will be given the opportunity to
send a message. Which one of you who will be able to send this message is
decided randomly each period. In the message you can agree on selecting
the same number and thereby splitting the value of the number you chose.
If you want to send a message, write your choice of number on the white
form otherwise put a cross in the ”no message” square. The experimenter
will collect the form and deliver them to your opponent. On the same form
your opponent will indicate if she/he agrees or not, the form will then be
returned to you. Note that the message is not binding, that is, you are not
obliged to chose the same number as you write/agree on in the message. It
will cost you 9(2) SEK to send a message. It will also cost 9(2) SEK to
reply to a message. The experimenter will register if you send a message
and deduct the fee from your final earnings. After the message has been
sent and returned you make your choice of number.
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2 Message and bid forms
This is a translation of the message and bid forms.
2.1 Message form
Period X
ID-number: ......... No message  or
I consider ...... to be an appropriate number.
ID-number: ......... No message  or
I agree: 
I do not agree: 
2.2 Bid form (Yellow form)
Your ID-number: ......... Your opponent’s ID-number.........
You fill in this column The experimenter fills in this column
Period: 1 My choice....... My opponent’s choice.......








Sex:  female  male








Question 2. Did you trust that your opponent would choose the number
she / he suggested in her / his messages?
..............................................................................................................................






Question 3. Do you believe that your opponent did trust that you would
choose the numbers that you suggested in your messages?
..............................................................................................................................






Question 4. If you and your opponent did agree to choose the same
number and shared profits, why didn’t you choose a smaller number in






Question 5. If your opponent didn’t keep his word, would you consider
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agreeing on a new message from your opponent?
..............................................................................................................................
Why / Why not ?
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
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